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CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw - MumcIPAL CONTROL OF PuBLIC
STREETS AND PARKS As AFFECTING FREEDOM oF SPEECH AND AssEMBLY-ln

recent years the United States Supreme Court completed the
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incorporation of the provisions of the First Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment's "due process" clause.1 The right against abridgment of free speech, press, assembly, and religion by any governmental
unit is now entirely under the aegis of the United States Constitution'
and £.rmly protected from state legislative encroachment. This recognition was not won without long and persistent efforts; however, its
acquisition has created more problems than it has settled. If the right
to self-government and individual liberty are to remain untrammelled,
some power to regulate conduct that lies within the protected sphere
of the Fourteenth Amendment (as it embodies the First Amendment)
needs to be retained by the state and local governments. In other words,
these rights cannot be called absolute. 2 To the Supreme Court of the
United States has fallen the unexpected and thankless task of striking
a satisfactory balance between the claims of individuals and the interests of society as a whole. 3
It is the purpose of this comment to explore only one small part of
the problem: the £.ght for freedom of speech and assembly as opposed
by the municipality's police power to control its streets and parks.
Three decisions handed down by the Supreme Court on January 15,
1951,4 will form the basis for an appraisal of the Supreme Court's pres1

The Supreme Court included freedom of speech and of the press as part of the lib-

erty guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause in Gitlow v. New

York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 S.Ct. 625 (1925). In 1937, de Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353,
57 S.Ct. 255, included the right to assemble peacefully. In 1940, Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900, extended protection to the free exercise of religion. The
incorporation of First Amendment freedoms into the Fourteenth Amendment was completed
in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504 (1947), where the Supreme
Court stated that no state can establish a religion, or "aid one religion, aid all religions, or
prefer one religion over another." See Green, "The Supreme Court, the Bill of Rights and
the States," 97 Umv. PA. L. RBv. 608 (1949).
2 See Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 at 206, 39 S.Ct. 249 (1919) where
Justice Holmes said, " ... the First Amendment while prohibiting legislation against free
speech as such cannot have been, and obviously was not, intended to give immunity for
every possible use of language." Also see Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 27 S.Ct.
556 (1907); Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 35 S.Ct. 383 (1915); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900 (1940); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 62 S.Ct. 766 (1942).
3 Professor Chafee advocates an enlarged scope to the judicial function. In his book,
FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STA'I'ES (1948) at 34, he quotes, with approval, this statement by Justice Holmes: "I think that the judges themselves have failed adequately to
recognize their duty of weighing considerations of social advantage. The duty is inevitable,
and the result of the often proclaimed aversion to deal with such considerations is simply
to leave the very ground and foundation of judgments inarticulate and often unconscious."
Recent Supreme Court justices have not been unanimous in entertaining this view of the
extent of the Court's function in civil cases. For example see Justice Jackson's dissent in
Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 at 571, 68 S.Ct. ll48 (1949), where he says: ."It is for
the local communities to balance their own interests."
4 Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 71 S.Ct. 303 (1951); Kunz v. New York, 340
U.S. 290, 71 S.Ct. 312 (1951); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 71 S.Ct. 325 (1951).
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ent position in this area. However, the full import of these cases cannot be realized without :6.rst considering the history of the struggle and
how the Court has dealt with it.

I. The Calm Before the Storm: The Era of Legislative Dominance
The Boston Commons case best reflects the attitude of the United
States Supreme Court toward the municipality's restrictions on the use
of public streets and parks during the late 1800's.5 The defendant had
made a speech on the Boston Common without the permit required by
a city ordinance. 6 The Massachusetts Supreme Court, speaking
through Justice Holmes, upheld the defendant's conviction under the
ordinance and likened the municipality's proprietary right to control
its parks to the right of a private citizen to control his dwelling place.7
The court reasoned that the defendant could not complain that the
ordinance allowed the mayor to issue permits in a discriminatory manner, since the city had the right to forbid absolutely all public speaking
on the Common. The United States Supreme Court closely followed
the state court's opinion in affirming the judgment.
During this period the Supreme Court maintained a consistent
hands-off policy with regard to legislation for police power purposes.8
It was theoretically possible that the Supreme Court would upset a
state legislature's act or state judiciary's findings of fact or law as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment's requirement for due process of
law.9 Yet, as a practical matter, the states were left undisturbed to
exercise what each considered to be proper police power control. In
the field of civil rights it was generally conceded that the state could
enact "reasonable" ordinances regulating or prohibiting the distribution
of handbills, circulars, samples and other advertising matter in such
manner as will ordinarily result in littering the streets, sidewalks, or
other public places.10 Typical of still later state action, the Wisconsin
5 Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 17 S.Ct. 731 (1897).
6 162 Mass. 510 at 51() (1895): "Section 66 ·of chapter 43 of

the 'Revised Ordinances
of the City of Boston, 1892,' is as follows: 'No person shall, in or upon any of the public
grounds, make any public address .•• except in accordance with a permit from the mayor.' "
7Davis v. Massachusetts, 162 Mass. 510, 39 N.E. 113 (1895).
8 See CHAPEE, FREE SPEECH IN nm UNITED STATES 412 (1948). See also the discussion in 22 A.L.R. 1484 (1923) and 114 A.L.R. 1446 (1938).
9 The Court required a finding that the legislature or state courts acted completely
arbitrarily or capriciously before it would invalidate their action. See Fox v. Washington,
236 U.S. 273, 35 S.Ct. 383 (1915).
10 Wettengel v. Denver, 20 Colo. 552, 39 P. 343 (1895); In re Anderson, 69 Neb.
686, 96 N.W. 149 (1903); Zinn v. State, 88 Ark. 273, 114 S.W. 227 (1908); Intl. Textbook Co. v. District of Columbia, 35 App. D.C. 307 (1910); Sieroty v. Huntington Park,
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Supreme Court, in 1931, upheld, as not violating the constitutional
guaranty of free speech, a Milwaukee ordinance prohibiting distribution of "circulars, handbills, cards, posters or dodgers" as applied to
circulars setting forth political and economic views.11 Even as late as
1935 the New Jersey Supreme Court upheld an ordinance which prohibited canvassing, solicitation, or distribution of circulars or other
matter without .first having reported to, and having obtained a written
permit from, the police, as applied to persons distributing pamphlets
disseminating their religious conceptions and soliciting their sale.12

II. Liberty Takes the Field: Enter Jehovah's Witnesses
The decision, in 1925, in Gitlow v. New York13 made clear that
freedom of speech and press were finally included within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment's "due process" clause. Yet this
;result certainly did not determine the degree of protection that need be
accorded these rights. The majority in the Gitlow case said: "Every
presumption is to be indulged in favor of the validity of the statute....
[Each case] ... is to be considered 'in the light of the principle that the
State is primarily the judge of regulations required in the interest of
public safety and welfare;' and that its police 'statutes may only be
declared unconstitutional where they are arbitrary or unreasonable attempts to exercise authority vested in the· State in the public interest.' "14 According to this view, it would seem that the :u;i.corporation
of the guarantee of free speech into the Fourteenth Amendment had
effected little change in our concept of due process. This conclusion
seems further justified when we look at the type of state regulations
indirectly sanctioned during this period by the Supreme Court's refusal
to grant certiorari.15
Nevertheless, Gitlow 11. New York had created a theoretical chink
in the legislature's armor; through this chink, in 1937, Lovell 11.
Ill Cal. App. 377, 295 P. 564 (1931); San Francisco Shopping News Co. v. South San
Francisco, (9th Cir. 1934) 69 F. (2d) 8_79, cert. den. 293 U.S. 606, 55 S.Ct. 122 (1935).
11 Milwaukee

v. Kassen, 203 Wis. 383, 234 N.W. 352 (1931).
12Dziatkiewicz v. Maplewood Twp., 115 N.J.L. 37, 178 A. 205 (1935). See also
Coleman v. Griffin, 55 Ga. App. 123, 189 S.E. 427 (1936), appeal dismissed by United
States Supreme Court in 302 U.S.· 636, 58 S.Ct. 23 (1937).
1s 268 U.S. 652, 45 S.Ct. 625 (1925).
14Id. at 668-9.
15 See Sa.n Francisco Shopping News Co. v. South San Francisco, (9th Cir. 1934)
69 F. (2d) 879, ·cert. den. 293 U.S. 606, 55 S.Ct. 122 (1934). Also see Coleman v.
Griffin, 55 Ga. App. 123, 189 S.E. 427 (1936), appeal dismissed by United States Supreme Court "for the -want of a substantial federal question" and "for the want of a properly presented federal question" in 302 U.S. 636, 58 S.Ct. 23 (1937) (italics added).
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Griffin16 drew :6.rst blood.17 Jehovah's Witness Lovell had distributed
religious tracts in Griffin, Georgia, without applying for permission
as required by a city ordinance. Lovell was indicted and convicted
under this ordinance, which forbade the distribution of advertising and
so-called literature of any kind, free or sold, without prior written permission from the city manager. The Supreme Court held the ordinance
unconstitutional on its face as a previous restraint on publication.18
Two years later, in Schneider 11. Irvington,1 9 the Supreme Court
invalidated a drastic permit ordinance which required the applicant to
be photographed and :fingerprinted so as to prevent people from soliciting money fraudulently or getting into houses for criminal purposes.
Since the ordinance gave sole discretion to the chief of police to refuse
the permit and prescribed no standards to guide his conduct, the system
could be used to censor unpopular ideas. On this basis, the Court
found the ordinance void on its face, if it applied to persons like the
defendant, a Jehovah's Witness, who solicited pursuant to her religious
convictions, though the Court indicated that such an ordinance might
be valid as applied to commercial soliciting and canvassing.
In three other cases handed down at the same time as the Schneider
decision, the Supreme Court invalidated ordinances which absolutely
prohibited distribution of handbills in the streets, where littering was
encouraged.20 The Supreme Court felt that the purpose of keeping the
streets clean did not justify denial of the right of distribution.21 Thus,
the legislature was no longer the :6.nal judge as to the propriety of
police power legislation which conB.icted with civil rights. If such
legislation was not to be found arbitrary and capricious, the evil designed to be prevented had to be substantial enough to justify the invasion of individual liberties. Although the presumption was still in favor
of the validity of the legislation, as in the Gitlow case, the Supreme
Court would now closely question the necessity and advisability of such
legislation.
16 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666 (1938). See also Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418, 63
S.Ct. 667 (1943) where the Supreme Court held a similar ordinance void.
17This case marked the beginning of a long series of successful onslaughts against
state police regulations by a religious sect known as the Jehovah's Witnesses. See the
article by Waite, "The Debt of Constitutional Law to Jehovah's Witnesses," 28 Mum. L.
REv. 209 (1944).
18 Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 27 S.Ct. 556 (1907), stated that the federal
government could impose no previous restraints on the press under the First Amendment,
though the majority intimated that this prohibition did not extend to the states.
19 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146 (1939).
20 Young v. California, Snyder v. Milwaukee, Nichols v. Massachusetts. These were
discussed together with Schneider v. Irvington in 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146 (1939).
21 For a later case where the Supreme Court invalidated such an ordinance see Jamison
v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 63 S.Ct. 669 (1943).
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Finally, in 1939, the Boston Commons case22 was overturned. In
Hague 11. CIQ23 it was held that a city did not have the right to exercise every kind of power over its parks, no matter how discrimin~tory.
In this case, an ordinance of Jersey City, New Jersey, required a permit
for meeting on public ground. 24 The permit could be refused by the
licensing official only "for the purpose of preventing riots, disturbances,
or disorderly assemblages."25 However, the construction given the ordinance by the New Jersey courts vested the licensing officials with wide
discretio:q. and it was evident that the licensing power had been abused
in the past to suppress unpopular views. 26 The Supreme Court held
the ordinance invalid on its face as an abridgment of freedom of assembly, now included within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. The petitioner had been refused a license, according to the New
Jersey officials, because of fear of disorder. Although the facts of the
case show that no such danger was imminent,27 the Supreme Court
refused to decide the case on its facts. A far-reaching result of this ·
decision was the elimination of prior restraints against speech and assembly in public places, solely in the interest of preventing violence.
Because of the Hague case, local officials had to permit a public meeting to take place, even if their fears of disorder were well-founded, and
to permit the meeting to continue until ,there was a "clear and present
danger" of force and violence.28
22navis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 17 S.Ct. 731 (1897).
2a 307 U.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 954 (1939).
24 The Bill of Rights Committee of the American Bar Association filed a brief amicus
curiae in the Hague case, which is set out in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 at 678, 59
S.Ct. 954 (1939). This brief stressed the importance of freedom of assembly to the
American democratic system and pointed out that "the outdoor meeting is especially
adapted to the promotion of unpopular causes, since such causes are likely to command
little financial support and therefore must often be promoted by persons who do not have
the financial means to 'hire a hall' or purchase time on the radio." It further pointed out
that "as a practical matter a city has a virtual monopoly of every open space at which a
considerable open meeting can be held, because vacant private land in cities has become
scarce and expensive."
25 The ordinance is set out in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 at 502, 59 S.Ct. 954
(1939).
26 See CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 411 (1948).
27 See the majority opinion of Justice Roberts in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 at 502,
59 S.Ct. 954 (1939).
28 This "clear and present danger" test was fust proposed by Justice Holmes in Schenck
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 S.Ct. 247 0919), as a test of the applicability of a
criminal conspiracy statute to the individual defendant. ''The question in every case is
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create
a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress
has a right to prevent." Id. at 52. The majority in the Gitlow case, 268 U.S. 652, 45
S.Ct. 625 (1925), stated that this was no general test of constitutionality but merely a
manner of construing a broad, general statute. Judge Learned Hand suggests in United
States v. Dennis, (2d Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 202, that the "clear and present danger"
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Nevertheless, the Hague decision does not seem to have gone so far
as to say that a city could not subject its streets and parks to reasonable
regulation, for in Cox v. New Hampshire, 29 the Supreme Court upheld a narrowly drawn statute requiring a permit and license fee for
parades. This license could be refused only for "considerations of time,
place and manner so as to conserve the public convenience ... [and]
the [license] fee was ... 'to meet the expense incident to the administration of the Act and to the maintenance of public order in the manner licensed.' " 30
The Hague decision, then, left intact a limited area where the
municipality is free to exert prior restraints against speech and assembly. a1
Futher amplifying the Hague decision, 32 Cantwell v. Connecticui33 seemingly defined the scope of the municipality's authority to
quell disturbances resulting from public meetings. Justice Roberts explained the test as follows: "When clear and present danger of riot,
disorder, interference with traffic upon the public streets, or other immediate threat to public safety, peace, or order, appears, the power of
the state to prevent or punish is obvious."34
III.

The Tide of Battle Turns: Preferred Place of Freedom of Speech

The year 1943 marked the beginning of a new attitude on the part
of the United States Supreme Court toward legislation which interfered with civil liberties. 35 Recent years had found the Supreme Court
sustaining as constitutional an ordinance which made the "Hag salute''
in public schools compulsory.36 It also sustained nondiscriminatory
taxes on the sale of religious literature. 37 In 1943, these cases were
concept can be equated with the balancing of the public interest against the private right
invaded. Judges need "ask whether the gravity of the 'evil' discounted by its improbability,
justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger."
20 312 U.S. 569, 61 S.Ct. 762 (1941).
30 Id. at 575-7.
31 Sellers v. Johnson, (2d Cir. 1947) 163

F. (2d) 877, followed the Hague doctrine
that a proposed meeting cannot be prohibited in advance because hostile factions threaten
a riot or police officers believe breaches of peace will occur if the rights of free speech and
assembly are exercised. The Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari in 332 U.S. 851,
68 S.Ct. 356 (1948).
a2 307 U.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 954 (1939).
33 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900 (1940).·
34 Id. at 308.
35 Professor Waite, in 28 MINN. L. RBv. 209 (1944) traces this new viewpoint back
to 1941 and the decision in Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 62 S.Ct. 190 (1941), but
his conclusion as to the time of origin of the new attitude seems of doubtful validity.
36 Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 60 S.Ct. 1010 (1940).
37 Jon~ v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 62 S.Ct. 1231 (1942).
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overruled.38 However, the real significance of these overruling decisions
was that they seemingly marked the end of the Supreme Court's deference to the legislature. In the Barnette case,39 three of the majority
referred to the "preferred" position of free speech; since that time the
term has occupied a prominent place in the Supreme Court's opinions.40
Justice Murphy41 and Justice Rutledge42 would say that this "preferred position" means that legislation impinging on freedom of speech
is prima facie invalid and that the burden is on the state to prove the
reasonableness and necessity of such legislation. ~l\lthough it is doubtful that the other justices who have applied this appellation would
carry its implications that far, still the result of the use of this term is
significant. For, as Green has stated,43 "in the balancing of interests
there must be placed in the scales, against the social value of the governmental abridgment, a heavy (and uniform) weight representing
the absolute value of the freedom, apart from and in addition to the
Court's estimate of the social value of the utterance in the particular
case."
This new attitude manifested itself in Saia v. New Y ork44 where
the majority opinion of Justice Douglas indicated that the "preferred
position of free speech" need be taken into account in adjudging the
constitutionality of an ordinance which required a license from the
chief of police for use of sound amplification devices in public places.
The Court held the ordinance invalid for it did not prescribe standards
to be applied in passing upon license application, though there was
no indication that a license had ever been refused for discriminatory

a

38West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178
(1943), overruled the Gobitis case, 310 U.S. 586, 60 S.Ct. 1010 (1940). Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 63 S.Ct. 870 (1943) was recognized as analogous to Jones v.
Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 62 S.Ct. 1231 (1942), and was decided contrary to that decision.
A rehearing of Jones v. Opelika was held in 319 U.S. 103, 63 S.Ct. 890 (1943) and the
original judgment vacated.
39 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178 (1944).
40 The Court has not been unanimous in according freedom of speech a preferred
position. Justice Frankfurter and Justice Jackson, in particular, have repeatedly refused to
subscribe to this doctrine. While Justice Jackson would have the Court refrain from interfering with legislative findings altogether, Justice Frankfurter advocates the more moderate
approach of Holmes and Brandeis: he would uphold the legislation unless clearly unreasonable and would use the Holmes "clear and present danger" test in applying the legislation
to the facts of an individual case.
41 See Justice Murphy's dissent in Prince,_ v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 at 173, 64
S.Ct. 438 (1944).
42 See Justice Rutledge's concurrence in United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 at 140,
68 S.Ct. 1349 (1948).
43 Green, "The Supreme Court, the Bill of Rights and the States," 97 Umv. PA. L.
R.Ev. 608 at 636 (1949).
4 4 334 U.S. 558, 68 S.Ct. 1148 (1948), noted in 47 MxcH. L. R.Ev. 111 (1948) and
58 YALE L.J. 335 (1949).
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reasons. 45 However, the significance of this decision is somewhat nullified by the fact that an ordinance which, in effect, banned the operation of all sound trucks was sustained one year later in Kovacs v.
Cooper. 46
Not all language was said to occupy this "preferred position" however. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire41 reaffirmed Cantwell v. Connecticut48 where the Court had said: "Resort to epithets or personal
abuse is not in any proper sense communication of information or
opinion safeguarded by the Constitution, and its punishment as a
criminal act would raise no question under that instrument."49
Chaplinsky, a Jehovah's Witness, had stirred up public resentment
as he distributed handbills on the streets. A city marshal attempted to
lead Chaplinsky to a police station in order to protect him from threatened violence. On the way, Chaplinsky allegedly called the marshal
a "damned racketeer" and "damned fascist." Chaplinsky was indicted
and convicted for these statements under a city ordinance50 which
declared punishable the "addressing of any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any other person lawfully in any street or any other
public place, or calling him by any offensive or derisive name." The
Supreme Court upheld the conviction stating that while the Fourteenth
Amendment protects the individual from abridgment of freedom of
speech, such protection is not absolute in nature. Speaking through
Justice Murphy, the Court said: "There are certain well-defined and
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which have never been thought to raise any constitutional problem.
These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the
insulting or 'fighting' words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace."51

IV. Recent Decisions
At first glance, the holdings in the three most recent Supreme
Court decisions touching on this field seem to add little to the approach
45 See

Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion to the Niemotko, Feiner and Kunz

cases, 340 U.S. 273 at 280, 71 S.Ct. 328 (1951).
46 336
47 315

U.S. 77, 69 S.Ct. 448 (1949).
U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766 (1942), discussed in 2

BILL OP RIGHTS RBv. 224
(1942).
48 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900 (1940).
49 Id. at 309.
50 N.H. P.L., c. 378, §2.
51 315 U.S. 568 at 571, 62 S.Ct. 766 (1942). However, the use of the term ''Fascist"
was found not to be a "fighting word" in Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S.
293, 64 S.Ct. 126 (1943).
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of recent years. These decisions are highly significant; however, for,
considered as a unit, they stiggest that a more empirical attitude has
been adopted toward reconciling the private and public interests. The
first of these decisions, Niemotko
Maryland, 52 is important only in
that it reaffirms certain fundamental safeguards for freedom of speech,
press and religion. Yet, it serves as a reassurance that if the court has
retreated from its advanced position in regard to civil liberties, as
feared qy Justice Black in Feiner 11. New York,53 it has certainly not
abdicated its role as final arbiter.
In the Niemotko case, although there was no ordinance prohibiting
or regulating the use of the city's public park, it had been customary
for organizations and individuals desiring to use it for meetings and
celebrations of various kinds to obtain a permit from the park commissioner, and religious groups had never been denied permission when
the park was available. A local Jehovah's Witness group requested permission from the commissioner for use of the park for Bible talks on
certain Sundays. The commissioner refused to grant their request, and
they petitioned the city council, which rejected their petition after a
hearing at which the applicants appeared and were questioned by the
council about their views on saluting the B.ag, the Catholic Church,
and service in the armed forces. 54 No questions were asked about matters relating to public order or convenience in the use of the park.
The Witnesses proceeded to hold their meeting after their request had
been denied, and the petitioner, Niemotko, was arrested shortly after
he began his lecture. He was convicted of disorde~ly conduct, although
there was no evidence of disorder, threats of violence, or riot at the
time of his arrest. The Supreme- Court of the United States reversed
the conviction by the Maryland circuit court5 5 on the grounds (a) that
the licensing requirement was an invalid prior restraint on the rights
of religion and assembly;56 (b) that the petitioner's group had been

v.

52 340 U.S. 268, 71 S.Ct. 325 (1951).
53 340 U.S. 315 at 322-323, 71 S.Ct. 303 (1951).
64 See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 at 274,
55 Under the constitution of Maryland, Art. 15, §5,

71 S.Ct. 325 (1951).
the jury is the judge of the law
as well as the facts, and so there is normally no appellate review of any question depending
on the sufficiency of the evidence. The court of appeals of Maryland thus declined to take
the case up on appeal or to grant certiorari, finding the issues not to be matters of public
interest.
56 Licensing requirements constitute invalid prior restraints on freedom of speech, press
and religion unless they prescribe narrowly drawn, reasonable and definite standards for the
licensing authorities to follow, as in Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 61 S.Ct. 762
(1941), where the Supreme Court permitted use of the licensing system under a statute
requiring a permit for parades and which was narrowly construed by the state courts to
permit refusal only for considerations of time, place and maimer so as to conserve the public
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denied equal protection of the laws; and (c) that actual breach of the
peace could not have been the basis for the conviction since there was
no evidence of violence or riot at the tim~ of the petitioner's arrest.
Kunz v. People of the State of New York57 presents a problem similar to that in the Niemotko case-the attempt of a city to exert a prior
restraint on freedom of religious speech by means of a licensing system.
However, defendant Kunz does not present the sympathetic picture
that Niemotko did. For this reason, Justice Jackson, who joined in the
unanimous Niemotko holding, dissented from the reversal of Kunz's
conviction for speaking at Columbus Circle without the permit required by a New York City ordinance.
In the Kunz case, a narrowly drawn New York ordinance58 made
it unlawful to hold public worship meetings on the streets without :6rst
obtaining an annually issued permit from the city police commissioner.
The ordinance made no reference to any power to revoke the permit,
nor did it mention any grounds on which a permit could be denied.
Kunz, an ordained Baptist minister, applied for, and obtained, a permit
for the year 1946. According to the city authorities his meetings
brought in complaints that he was making scurrilous attacks on Catholics and Jews. Kunz's own testimony revealed that his utterances
caused so much hostility on the part of his audiences that he continually needed police protection.59 The city revoked Kunz's permit in
November 1946, for "ridiculing and denouncing other religious beliefs" and his applications for permits in 1947 and 1948 were disapproved by the police commissioner, who gave no reason for this action.
Kunz was arrested in 1948 for speaking at Columbus Circle in New
York City without a permit. The New York court of appeals construed the ordinance to require that all initial requests for permits by
eligible applicants need be granted, but that a permit could be revoked
"for cause" and subsequent applications denied. The United States
Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the grounds that the ordinance, as construed, operated as an invalid prior restraint on the exercise of religious freedom.
Justice Jackson's dissent did not meet the main argument raised by
convenience. A narrowly drawn licensing statute which was construed by the courts and
applied by the licensing authorities as placing complete discretion in the mayor to refuse
the permit was invalidated in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 954 (1939).
57

340 U.S. 290, 71 S.Ct. 312 (1951).

58 N.Y. Admin. Code, c. 10, §435-7.0.
59 See Justice Jackson's dissent in the Kunz

312 (1951).

case, 340 U.S. 290 at 295-297, '71 S.Ct.
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both the majority opinion of Chief Justice Vinson and the concurring
opinion of Justice Frankfurter: as construed by the New York court
of appeals, the ordinance would have vested unlimited discretion in
the police commissioner to deny renewal applications, as well as authority to revoke existing permits, since it prescribed no standards to
guide the commissioner's conduct. This licensing system manifestly
could be abused in order to censor unpopular religious views.
However, Justice Jackson does raise an interesting question suggested by the facts of the Kunz case: he asks whether the Kunzes need
be continually surrounded by phalanxes of police to protect them from
the audiences enraged each time they speak 60 Need the city, each
time, await the inevitable "fighting words," such as "Christ-Killer" before its police can intervene to stop the speaker? If we follow the implications of Hague v. CIO,61 the city must permit such speakers to
cause an actual disturbance before it can interfere. Yet there is a faint
inkling in the majority opinion, and a definite commitment on the part
of Justice Frankfurter, that this may not be true. If a narrowly drawn
ordinance provided for revocation or denial of such a permit, setting
out in detail the reasons for which such revocation, or ,denial, could
be made, and giving detailed administrative procedure to eliminate
abuses, it might prove constitutional especially if the permit could be
withheld for only a reasonable time. Although such a result would be
heartily condemned by those who feel that even the "fighting words"
doctrine of the Chaplinsky decision62 represents an unjustified inroad
on the First Amendment freedoms, 63 it actually would be more in accordance with the views entertained by other free speech advocates. 64
The highly controversial holding in the third of the recent decisions, Feiner v. People of the State of New York,6-s is in complete contrast to the predictable results of the Kunz and Niemotko decisions.
The Feiner case presents the question at what point can the munici60 Justice Jackson's dissent, 340 U.S. 301 and 302, 71 S.Ct. 312 (1951).
61307 U.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 954 (1939). Also see Sellers v. Johnson, (2d Cir. 1947)
163 F. (2d) 877, cert. den. 332 U.S. 851, 68 S.Ct. 356 (1948).
62 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766 (1942).
63 See Antieau, "The Rule of Clear and Present Danger: Scope of Its Applicability,"
48 MlcH. L. Rl;v. 811 (1950).
64 See Mmxr.BJoHN, FREE SPBBCH AND rrs RBunoN To Sl!LF-GoVllRNMBNT 99
(1948). Also see the brief filed amicus curiae by the Bill of Rights Committee of the
American Bar Association in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 at 678, 59 S.Ct. 954 (1939)
set out in 25 A.B.A.J. 7 (1939). The committee advised permitting local officials to prohibit proposed meetings, if this is necessary to avoid a clear and present danger of real
disorder. A permit ordinance is valid if it be carefully worded to require a genuine fear
based on substantial evidence.
65 340 U.S. 315, 71 S.Ct. 303 (1941), discussed in 49 MicH. L. RBv. 896 (1951).
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pality intervene to stop speaking on the public streets in order to prevent disorder. Feiner, a college student, stood on a soap-box at the edge
of a sidewalk and addressed a mixed group of Negroes and Whites
through a loud-speaker, urging them to attend a meeting on racial discrimination and civil liberties to be held that evening at a local hotel.
This meeting had previously been scheduled to take place in a public
school building, but the city authorities had cancelled the permit that
very day. Feiner heatedly criticized the city authorities for their actions
but did not use profane language. On their arrival at the scene, two
police officers found a crowd of seventy-.6.ve to eighty persons gathered
around the speaker, .filling the sidewalk, and spilling over into the
street, compelling pedestrians to walk in the street to avoid the crowd.
The officers described the crowd as restlessly shoving and milling
around. The speaker had urged the Negro populace to .fight for civil
equality and this had engendered both approval and hostility on the
part of the crowd. However, the evidence is in conllict as to the gravity
of the situation. The officers feared that uncontrolled disorder or even
a racial riot was imminent and requested the speaker to break up the
meeting. He ignored their request and continued talking. After Feiner
ignored the officers' second request, he was placed under arrest and
charged with disorderly conduct in violation of Penal Law of New
York, section 722, subdivision 1-3. 66 He was duly convicted and the
conviction was affirmed by the New York appeal courts. The United
States Supreme Court affirmed Feiner's conviction, Justices Black,
Douglas, and Minton dissenting. Where there is contradictory evidence
of clear danger of disorder, the trial judge's .findings that the police officers have exercised proper discretionary power to prevent a breach of
peace rather than to suppress the speaker's views, when supported by
the state appeal courts, will be respected by the United States Supreme
Court. The majority opinion emphasized that Feiner had "passed the
bounds of argument and persuasion" and undertaken "incitement to
riot."
Justice Black, in his dissenting opinion in the Feiner case, regards
the majority's approach as a distinct departure from the Supreme
66 "§722. Any person who with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or whereby
a breach of the peace may be occasioned, commits any of the following acts shall be deemed
to have committed the offense of disorderly conduct:
I. Uses offensive, disorderly, threatening, abusive or insulting language, conduct or
behavior;
2. Acts in such manner as to annoy, disturb, interfere with, obstruct, or be offensive
to others;
3. Congregates with others on a public street and refuses to move on when ordered
by the police. • ••"
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Court's recent position in the sphere of civil liberties. As Justice Black
points out, Feiner was not uttering "fighting words," so, under the
Hague doctrine, 67 the police had the primary duty to protect his constitutional right of free speech even to the extent of arresting those who
physically threatened him. There is no evidence that additional police
reinforcements were not available to defend Feiner adequately from his
hostile audience, nor is there clearly a preponderance of evidence of a
"clear and present danger of riot or disorder" to justify the termination
of the meeting. There is ample evidence of an "interference with traffic
upon the public streets" but the police made little attempt to expedite
the traffic, and it seems clear that this was not the primary factor behind
their stopping the meeting. The Supreme Court deferred to the state
court's findings that Feiner was "inciting to riot," but Justice Black is
quite correct that the Supreme Court of recent years has refused to accept controversial fact findings in cases ·involving invasion of civil liberties. 68 If free speech has a "preferred" place in regard to state legislative action, it should occupy an equally "preferred" place in regard to
police action.
J

V. Conclusion

The Feiner decision r~presents a long-awaited and much-needed
trend away from the Court's over-solicitude in protecting the individual
in the exercise of his First Amendment rights. The Supreme Court has
been so zealous of late in defending the individual from the encroachments of government that it has left the mass of individuals--societya helpless prey to the vagaries of a few. A reversal of Feiner's conviction, for example, would have tied the hands of municipal peace officers
to cope effectively with the problem of possible serious public disorder. As it is doubtful that even a trial judge can put himself in the
place of the officer confronted with the possibility of imminent rioting,
so is it true of the Supreme Court, there being substantial evidence on
the record to support the officer's actions.
Perhaps the Feiner decision means that the Supreme Court will reconsider the extreme stand it has taken in other civil liberties decisions.
It is submitted that the Supreme Court went too far in not deciding
Lovell v. Griffin, 69 Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 70 Saia v. New York, 71
67 Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 954 (1939).
68 Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 55 S.Ct. 579 (1934); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328
U.S. 331, 66 S.Ct. 1029 (1945); Craig v. Hamey, 331 U.S. 367, 67 S.Ct. 1249 (1947).
69 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666 (1938).
70 319 U.S. 157, 63 S.Ct. 877 (1943).
71334 U.S. 558, 68 S.Ct. 1148 (1948). Sound trucks seem "nuisances" whereby the
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and Cantwell v. Connecticut,7 2 among others, entirely on their facts.
The individual should be completely free in his own home, as well as on
the public streets, from the annoyances of religious proselyting or political haranguing. As Professor Chafee says, "Great as is the value of
exposing citizens to novel ideas, home is one place where a man ought
to be able to shut himself up in his own ideas if he so desires." 73
Too little consideration has been given by the Court in the past
to the plight of the Common Man, whom the Court purports to be
defending. When a man's religious convictions can be assailed at every
turn with the Supreme Court's blessing, as in Cantwell v. Connecticut,14 when a housewife cannot be protected by the municipality from
the annoyance of answering her doorbell all day in response to religious
solicitors, as in Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 75 this is surely liberty gone
mad. If the Feiner decision is evidence that the Supreme Court is
adopting a more reasonable attitude toward the problem of free speech,
this writer welcomes the change.
Lenamyra Saulson

individual's home privacy can be invaded, as Justice Frankfurter's dissent in the Saia case
indicates, rather than constitutionally protected speech devices.
12 310 U.S. 296,
73 CHA.PEE, FREE
74 310 U.S. 296,

60 S.Ct. 900 (1940).
SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 406 (1948).
60 S.Ct. 900 (1940).
75 319 U.S. 157, 63 S.Ct. 877 (1943).

